Why Russia Did Not Annex Crimea When Ukraine Was in Chaos

From my perspective, the question is not whether Russia should have annexed Crimea, but why it did not. This is a multifaceted issue that involves geopolitical strategy, economic resources, and the complex dynamics between Russia, Ukraine, and the international community.

The Russian Strategy and its Failures

Putin’s initial move to annex Crimea was more of a tactical test to gauge NATO’s response to a minor provocation. This demonstrated Moscow’s ability to capitalize on moments of instability. However, the strategy faltered when the Donbas situation developed. Initially, it was a false-flag insurgency aimed at creating a de-facto separation of the Donbas region from Ukraine, but it did not pan out as initially planned. The Ukrainian resistance surprised everyone, including Russia.

The reasons for not pressing forward with a full annexation are multifaceted. At its core, it was an error of judgment. Moscow had hoped and relied on a paradigm that had worked in other cases such as Transnistria, Georgia, and Armenia. The assumption was that Russia could indefinitely supply the Donbas with equipment and ammunition, keeping the region split from Ukraine at a low cost and preventing Ukraine from fully re-establishing control over the Donbas region in the foreseeable future.

The Paradigm and its Rationality

This paradigm, which Moscow adhered to through Putin’s years and earlier under Yeltsin, had worked in many cases. The idea was to sustain a territorial lesion - a “fester” - to neuter a country’s potential to join military alliances. However, the assumption turned out to be problematic due to several factors. Ukraine’s sheer size, its borders with Europe, and its ability to receive support from the West played a significant role in defying this paradigm.

Ukraine’s own stockpiles of competitive weapons, the presence of a military-industrial complex (even if not in its best shape), and the fact that the United States could easily control Kiev’s foreign policies through oligarchic influences all contributed to Moscow’s failed strategy. The Ukrainian resistance, supported by the West, proved to be more resilient than expected.

The Context and Consequences

By April 2021, Russia understood that its previous paradigm might not work with Ukraine. Given enough support from the West, Ukraine was consolidating the forces necessary to recapture the Donbas region fully. This realization led to a full-scale invasion in 2022, indicating a shift in strategy from the 2014 initial annexation.

It is crucial to recognize that factors such as economic resources, political dynamics, and external support from Western powers played a significant role in the failure of the initial strategy. Had Russia predicted these factors earlier, it might have opted for a different, more direct approach through a full-fledged invasion of Ukraine.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the failure to fully annex Crimea when Ukraine was in chaos was the result of a complex array of geopolitical and economic factors. The strategy of sustaining a territorial lesion without considering Ukraine’s potential for resilience ultimately proved to be flawed. This lesson underscores the importance of continuous strategic adjustments in the face of evolving geopolitical landscapes.

Key Points Recap

The initial annexation of Crimea was a test of NATO's response. Moscow's assumption that it could sustain the Donbas region indefinitely proved incorrect. Ukraine’s resilience, economic resources, and Western support played critical roles. A full-scale invasion became necessary as the initial strategy failed to achieve desired outcomes.

References

Further reading on the topic can be found in numerous academic and news publications, including the Council on Foreign Relations' report and the European Intelligence Unit's analysis.